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INTRODUCTION 
The False Claims Act1 (FCA) allows a private person (known as a qui 
tam relator) to bring an action on behalf of the federal government.2 Most 
commonly, relators bring claims against persons who “knowingly” present 
false claims for government payment,3 such as government contractors who 
seek payment for work they did not actually do, or against persons who 
“knowingly” make false statements “material to” a false claim against the 
 
1 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012). 
2 See id. § 3730(b).  
3 See id. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (making any person liable who “knowingly presents, or causes to be 
presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”). This section of the FCA was 
renumbered and amended in 2009, and is referred to in earlier cases as “subsection (a)(1).” Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 4(a)(1), 123 Stat. 1617, 1621–22. 
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government,4 such as employees who create fraudulent records of services 
that were never actually delivered. When successful, these “whistleblower 
claims” allow the relator to recover a portion of the proceeds of the action 
subject to requirements of the statute.5 
The FCA has been used to combat fraud against the government in a 
variety of industries from health care6 to mortgage lending7 to 
environmental services and energy production.8 Whistleblower claims 
under the FCA have increased in recent years, with strengthened 
whistleblower protections and incentives, coupled with aggressive 
government enforcement actions.9 Minimizing government fraud and waste 
has been a priority for recent administrations,10 which have overseen an 
unprecedented number of FCA claims and successful prosecutions with 
record-breaking recovery sums.11 The proliferation of such cases has 
produced creative arguments about what standards apply at each stage of 
FCA litigation, and with little guidance from the Supreme Court, the 
judicial landscape continues to evolve in this arena. 
 
4 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (making any person liable who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes 
to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim”). This section of 
the FCA was renumbered and amended in 2009, and is referred to in earlier cases as “subsection 
(a)(2).” Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 § 4(a)(1). 
5 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (offering whistleblower bounties of as much as 30% of the recovery and 
calibrating the exact amounts based on significance of information and whether government 
intervenes).  
6 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to 
Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data: Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in 
U.S. History (July 2, 2012) (available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.html); 
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Maxim Healthcare Services Charged with Fraud, Agrees to Pay 
Approximately $150 Million, Enact Reforms After False Billings Revealed as Common Practice (Sept. 
12, 2011) (available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/September/11-civ-1169.html). 
7 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of N.Y., $1 Billion to be Paid by the Bank of 
America to the United States: Largest False Claims Act Settlement Relating to Mortgage Fraud (Feb. 9, 
2012) (available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2012/2012feb09.html). 
8 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BP Amoco to Pay U.S. $20.5 Million to Resolve 
Allegations of Royalty Underpayments from Indian and Federal Lands (Sept. 16, 2011) (available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/September/11-civ-1201.html). 
9 See Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics—Overview: October 1, 1987 to September 
30, 2013 (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf 
[hereinafter Fraud Statistics] (documenting the number of qui tam claims pursued since the 1986 
amendments to the FCA, and the amount recovered in settlements, judgments, and relator share 
awards); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Celebrates 25th Anniversary of False 
Claims Act Amendments of 1986 (Jan. 31, 2012) (available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/
January/12-ag-142.html) (noting that the 1986 amendments “increase[d] the incentives for 
whistleblowers to come forward with allegations of fraud”).  
10 See Delivering an Efficient, Effective, and Accountable Government, Exec. Order No. 13,576, 
76 Fed. Reg. 35,297 (June 13, 2011).  
11 See Fraud Statistics, supra note 9.  
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To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6),12 FCA claims, which by definition allege fraud, must satisfy Rule 
9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. Rule 9(b) requires that: “In alleging 
fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other 
conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”13 The federal 
courts of appeals have been inconsistent in setting forth what a relator must 
allege in FCA qui tam claims to satisfy Rule 9(b), and the Supreme Court 
has thus far declined to resolve this issue.14 Some circuits have embraced a 
relatively permissive 9(b) standard and have not required relators to allege 
details of an actually submitted false claim, such as the date and billed 
amount from a fraudulent invoice.15 Other circuits have set a higher bar, 
requiring relators to allege very specific false claims to satisfy 9(b).16 
Relatedly, the circuit courts have recently split over the issue of 
whether a second FCA qui tam relator is barred by the FCA’s “first-to-file” 
rule17 from making essentially the same qui tam claim, if a prior claimant 
failed to plead enough specific information to satisfy 9(b).18 Some circuits 
have required an initial claimant to satisfy 9(b) in order to use the first-to-
file rule to preclude subsequent claims.19 Other circuits have determined 
that a first claim does not need to survive a 9(b) challenge to apply the first-
to-file rule in preventing similar, later-filed claims.20 
Uniform standards in these two evolving issues could significantly 
alter the success rate of whistleblower claims under the FCA. The two 
related issues should be considered together to ensure optimal outcomes 
from the FCA litigation process. As this Note shows, a more permissive 
9(b) standard is necessary to protect legitimate whistleblowers who have 
intimate knowledge of fraud but who do not have access to a defendant’s 
 
12 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing motions to dismiss claims for “failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted”). 
13 Id. 9(b). 
14 Compare United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29–30 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (not requiring relators to allege details of an actually submitted false claim), cert. denied, 130 
S. Ct. 3454 (2010), with Hopper v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(requiring relators to allege very specific false claims to satisfy 9(b)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3465 
(2010). 
15 See Duxbury, 579 F.3d at 29–30. 
16 See Hopper, 588 F.3d at 1327. 
17 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2012) (“When a person brings an action under this subsection, no 
person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying 
the pending action.”).   
18 Compare Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 972 (6th Cir. 2005) (requiring initial 
claimant to satisfy 9(b) in order to use the first-to-file rule), with United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM 
Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (not requiring first claim to survive a 9(b) challenge to 
apply the first-to-file rule). 
19 See, e.g., Walburn, 431 F.3d at 972. 
20 See, e.g., Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210. 
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actual bills or invoices. To properly fulfill the purpose of both 9(b) and the 
first-to-file rule, such a permissive 9(b) standard must be linked to the first-
to-file rule. Under this type of linked system, the more claims that are 
allowed to survive 9(b), the bigger the pool of claims defendants can draw 
from to bar later-filed claims. By requiring a claim to satisfy a permissive 
9(b) standard before it can be used to bar later claims, courts will be able to 
proportionally calibrate the relative advantages of defendants and 
whistleblowers in the FCA context. 
Part I of this Note outlines the positions circuit courts have taken on 
the level of specificity required for whistleblowers to survive 9(b)’s 
heightened pleading requirements. Part II details the divergence in circuit 
courts over the issue of whether a complaint that does not satisfy 9(b) can 
nevertheless be used to prevent related later-filed claims. Part III analyzes 
four combinations of the positions the circuit courts have taken on the two 
issues, and discerns the optimal balance of policies to best fulfill the 
purposes of the FCA. 
I. WHAT WHISTLEBLOWERS MUST ALLEGE TO SATISFY 9(b)—
DIFFERING CIRCUIT INTERPRETATIONS 
FCA claims are fraud claims that must satisfy Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements.21 The courts of appeals 
have not been consistent in interpreting 9(b)’s requirements in the 
whistleblower context, with little guidance from the Supreme Court on how 
specific an FCA claim must be to satisfy 9(b).22 What has been described as 
a circuit split23 in this arena may be more accurately characterized as a 
circuit splinter—two main jurisprudential branches, each with some cracks 
that have yet to be resolved in this evolving area of law. The primary 
disagreement centers around whether 9(b) constitutes an absolute 
requirement to allege details of an actually submitted false claim, such as 
dates and billed amounts from a particular fraudulent invoice, and if not, 
what level of specificity is enough to satisfy 9(b). 
On the more permissive side of the spectrum, the Fifth, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits do not require details of a specific, actually submitted false 
 
21 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a 
person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). 
22 Compare United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29–30 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (not requiring relators to allege details of an actually submitted false claim), cert. denied, 130 
S. Ct. 3454 (2010), with Hopper v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(requiring relators to allege very specific false claims to satisfy 9(b)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3465 
(2010). 
23 2010 Mid-Year False Claims Act Update, GIBSON DUNN, § V(A)(3) (July 9, 2010), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2010Mid-YearFalseClaimsActUpdate.aspx (“[T]here is 
a circuit split as to whether a relator must identify specific false claims in his or her complaint.”). 
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claim.24 The First Circuit, generally grouped with the Fifth, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits, requires specific claims, but allows for a more “flexible” 
approach for qui tam relators who allege that a defendant “induced third 
parties to file false claims with the government.”25 The Fourth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have required factually specific claims,26 
though some of these circuits have hinted at the possibility of allowing 
exceptions in certain types of cases.27 Finally, the Tenth Circuit is 
somewhere in the middle because it has embraced the more permissive 
standard of not requiring an allegation about a specific false claim, without 
explicitly disavowing its more stringent precedents.28 
A. Most Permissive: Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
The Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have not required a relator to 
provide details of an “actually submitted false claim” at the outset of FCA 
litigation, like the particulars of a specific fraudulent invoice.29 Instead, to 
satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirement for claims of fraud, 
they have allowed relators to allege just enough details of the allegedly 
fraudulent actions to “lead to a strong inference,”30 or at least a “plausible” 
inference,31 that false claims “were actually submitted.”32 
These courts conclude that to require details of specific fraudulent 
documents would preclude qui tam relators who do not have access to a 
defendant’s billing or accounting department from bringing forth legitimate 
claims. In United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., the relator was 
an engineer,33 and in United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti and Ebeid 
ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, the relators were physicians,34 all of 
whom claimed intimate knowledge of alleged fraudulent acts of their 
 
24 See Ebeid ex rel. United States. v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2010); United States ex 
rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854–55 (7th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Grubbs v. 
Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009).  
25 Duxbury, 579 F.3d at 29.  
26 See United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 457 (4th Cir. 
2013); United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., 639 F.3d 791, 799–800 (8th Cir. 2011); Hopper, 588 
F.3d at 1327–29; United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 504–05 (6th 
Cir. 2007). 
27 Hopper, 588 F.3d at 1327–29; Bledsoe, 501 F.3d at 504–05. 
28 See United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1172–73 (10th Cir. 
2010). 
29 Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 999; Lusby, 570 F.3d at 854; Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190. 
30 Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 998–99 (quoting Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190) (choosing to follow the Fifth 
Circuit’s reasoning and holding on requirements to satisfy 9(b)); Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190 (requiring 
FCA claimants to at least allege “particular details of a scheme to submit false claims” with “reliable 
indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were actually submitted”). 
31 Lusby, 570 F.3d at 854. 
32 Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190. 
33 570 F.3d at 850–51. 
34 Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 995–96; Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 183–85. 
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employers but lacked direct access to actual bills or invoices submitted to 
the government. The courts in these cases feared a more restrictive standard 
would foreclose the potential relators from “legitimate efforts to expose 
fraud,” in contravention of the “remedial purpose” of the FCA.35 
1. The Fifth Circuit Billing Example.—Grubbs illustrates the courts’ 
concern about frustrating the purpose of the FCA.36 The relator, Dr. James 
H. Grubbs, claimed that fellow doctors and nurses at his employer hospital 
attempted to co-opt him into an ongoing fraudulent scheme of billing the 
government’s Medicare and Medicaid programs for patient visits and other 
services that the doctors had not actually provided.37 In his complaint, 
Grubbs described his meetings with the doctors and nurses in detail, during 
which they tried to educate and assist him in the making of fraudulent 
medical records.38 He pointed to specific dates on which some of the other 
doctors had falsely recorded patient services, as well as the types of 
medical services claimed that were not actually performed.39 However, as a 
doctor, Grubbs only had access to the allegedly false medical records and 
not to the actual bills submitted to the government by the hospital’s billing 
system.40 
The hospital moved to dismiss Grubbs’s case. The Fifth Circuit noted 
that, taking the relator’s allegations to be true, any fraudulent medical 
records would almost certainly be billed to the government. It thus did not 
require Grubbs to allege details of the actual bills.41 If Grubbs’s allegations 
were true, an absolute requirement for details of the actual billed claims 
would prevent him, a valuable insider, from coming forward, despite his 
intimate knowledge of the fraud. Further, and perhaps more importantly, 
billing department employees with access to the actual invoices would have 
no reason to suspect fraud in processing the false medical records. This 
double insulation from potential whistleblowers on both the service and 
billing ends could protect this type of fraudulent scheme from discovery. 
2. The Issue of Proof in Pleadings.—The Fifth and Seventh Circuits 
have emphasized that proof is not required at the pleading stage, even 
under Rule 9(b)’s heightened standard, and that requiring details of specific 
fraudulent documents would be too similar to requiring proof at the 
 
35 Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190; see also Lusby, 570 F.3d at 854 (noting that requiring relators to have 
access to billing documents would “take[] a big bite out of qui tam litigation”). 
36 See 565 F.3d at 184–85. 
37 Id. at 192. 
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 See id.  
41 Id. (finding that it would “stretch the imagination” to infer that “recorded, but unprovided, 
services never get billed”). 
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pleading stage.42 The courts have found that Rule 9(b)’s purpose is still 
preserved under their interpretation in adequately protecting defendants 
from “strike suits” and “fishing expedition[s]” by predatory plaintiffs 
seeking to exact undeserved settlements with “baseless claims.”43 Indeed, 
the Seventh Circuit defended its interpretation of 9(b) as requiring enough 
details to prevent “vague and unsubstantiated accusations of fraud” from 
leading to “costly discovery and public obloquy.”44 
B. Mostly Restrictive, with Permissive Exception: First Circuit 
Until 2009, the First Circuit appeared to embrace a more restrictive 
approach to 9(b)45 than the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. It required 
relators to “provide details that identify particular false claims for 
payment” from the government.46 Then, in United States ex rel. Duxbury v. 
Ortho Biotech Products, L.P., the court distinguished its prior holdings by 
noting that the restrictive approach applied to allegations that the defendant 
directly made false claims to the government.47 The court carved out a 
more permissive exception for relators alleging that a defendant “induced 
third parties to file false claims with the government.”48 For claims of 
third-party inducement, the court held that a relator would be required to 
provide only enough evidence to “strengthen the inference of fraud beyond 
possibility,” and would not need to provide details of individual false 
claims.49 In applying this “more flexible standard,” the First Circuit noted 
that relators are still required to allege the “who, what, where, and when” 
of the allegedly false representation.50 
In Duxbury, the relator worked for a drug distributor as a sales 
representative responsible for promoting his company’s drugs to medical 
providers.51 He alleged that his employer gave its clients illegal kickbacks 
for their business, in the form of free drugs, which the medical providers 
used to file fraudulent Medicare reimbursement claims.52 Though he did 
not have access to the allegedly fraudulent bills submitted to the 
government, Duxbury named eight individual medical providers that he 
 
42 United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 2009); Grubbs, 
565 F.3d at 189–90. 
43 Grubbs, 565 F.3d at 190, 191 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
44 Lusby, 570 F.3d at 854–55. 
45 See United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 2009). 
46 United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, Inc., 507 F.3d 720, 731 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting United 
States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 232 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
47 579 F.3d at 29. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. (quoting Rost, 507 F.3d at 733) (citing United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 
180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)).  
50 Id. at 30. 
51 Id. at 16. 
52 Id. at 29–30. 
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claimed received kickbacks, and provided general dates and amounts of 
money the providers claimed for Medicare reimbursement.53 The court 
noted that Duxbury fell under a third-party inducement exception because 
the defendant employer’s alleged actions induced third-party medical 
providers to submit fraudulent claims to the government.54 Thus, the court 
found that Duxbury satisfied 9(b)’s requirements without pointing to exact 
dates and amounts of fraudulent bills submitted to the government, to 
which he did not have access.55 
1. The Issue of Presentment.—In distinguishing 9(b) requirements 
for allegations of direct false claims from third-party inducement claims, 
the First Circuit took care to note that its approach applied equally to 
claims brought against persons who allegedly “present[ed]” false claims 
(“subsection (a)(1)” claims),56 such as government contractors who seek 
payment for work they did not do, as well as persons who made or used 
false statements “material to” a false claim (“subsection (a)(2)” claims),57 
such as employees who create fraudulent records of services that were 
never actually delivered.58 The court noted that the distinction between 
subsection (a)(1) claims and subsection (a)(2) claims was not relevant to 
the analysis of which Rule 9(b) pleading standard should apply, despite the 
presentment requirement in subsection (a)(1) claims.59 
C. Most Restrictive, with Some Possibility of Future Exception:  
Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits 
On the most restrictive end of the spectrum, the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Eleventh Circuits have required FCA relators to identify specific false 
claims to meet Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements.60 These circuits have 
cited favorably to the same language as the First Circuit61 in requiring 
 
53 Id. at 30. 
54 See id. at 29–30. 
55 Id. at 30. 
56 Subsection (a)(1) claims now fall under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). See supra note 3. 
57 Subsection (a)(2) claims now fall under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B). See supra note 4. 
58 Duxbury, 579 F.3d at 29 n.6.  
59 Id. 
60 See United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 457 (4th Cir. 
2013); United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., 639 F.3d 791, 799–800 (8th Cir. 2011); Hopper v. 
Solvay Pharm., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. 
Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 504–05 (6th Cir. 2007). The Eleventh Circuit has used language similar 
to the more permissive Fifth Circuit in articulating 9(b)’s requirement of “some indicia of reliability,” 
but has required relators to allege specific false claims. Compare United States ex rel. Grubbs v. 
Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009) (requiring “reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference 
that claims were actually submitted”), with Hopper, 588 F.3d at 1326 (quoting United States ex rel. 
Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002)) (requiring “some indicia of 
reliability . . . of an actual false claim for payment being made to the Government”). 
61 See supra Part I.B. 
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relators to specify the “who, what, where, when, and how” of alleged fraud, 
but have gone a step further in requiring allegations of specific false 
claims,62 such as dates and billed amounts for individual fraudulent 
invoices. Interestingly, post-Duxbury, some of the cases within these 
circuits have begun to acknowledge the possibility of exceptions that may 
merit a departure from the strict requirement to allege details of specific 
false claims. 
1. The Sixth Circuit’s Potential Exception for Whistleblowers with 
“Specialized Knowledge.”—The Sixth Circuit has noted that Rule 
9(b)’s requirements might be “relaxed” in situations where relators are 
unable to produce details from “actual false claims” but have firsthand, 
“personal knowledge” that false claims were indeed submitted to the 
government for payment.63 The court has suggested, without affirmatively 
deciding, that in these circumstances, allegations of “facts which support a 
strong inference that a claim was submitted” may be sufficient.64 The court 
favorably discussed a district court case in which a relator’s former position 
as a billing specialist for the defendant afforded her “specialized 
knowledge” of the defendant’s billing practices.65 The district court allowed 
her to proceed with her qui tam claim, even though she was unable to point 
to specific claims because she was no longer employed by the defendant.66 
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Potential Exception for Nonpresentment 
Claims.—The Eleventh Circuit has taken a different approach 
from the Sixth Circuit. In Hopper v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc., it stated 
unequivocally that qui tam claims under subsection (a)(1) center around 
whether a defendant ever presented false claims for payment to the 
government, and require the “actual presentment of a claim be pled with 
particularity” to meet the court’s restrictive Rule 9(b) standard.67 However, 
the court distinguished claims under subsection (a)(2), noting that these 
claims only required the qui tam relator to show that the defendant had 
 
62 Vigil, 639 F.3d at 798; Hopper, 588 F.3d at 1327–29; Bledsoe, 501 F.3d at 510. 
63 Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 470–72 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Bledsoe, 501 F.3d at 504 
n.12). Chesbrough also cites an unpublished Eleventh Circuit case in its discussion of a possible 
“relaxed” standard. See Hill v. Morehouse Med. Assocs., Inc., No. 02-14429, 2003 WL 22019936, at *3 
(11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating “Rule 9(b)’s 
heightened pleading standard may be applied less stringently” where “specific factual information about 
the fraud is peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge or control”). 
64 Chesbrough, 655 F.3d at 471–72 (“Although we do not foreclose the possibility that this court 
may apply a ‘relaxed’ version of Rule 9(b) in certain situations, we do not find it appropriate to do so 
here.”). 
65 Id. at 471 (citing United States ex rel. Lane v. Murfreesboro Dermatology Clinic, PLC, No. 4:07-
cv-4, 2010 WL 1926131, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. May 12, 2010)).  
66 Id. (citing Lane, 2010 WL 1926131, at *4). 
67 588 F.3d at 1326–27. 
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“made false statements to get a false claim paid,” without having to show 
that the defendant actually submitted the claim herself.68 
In dicta, the court left open the possibility that subsection (a)(2) claims 
against those who simply make false statements or records may be subject 
to a “more relaxed” 9(b) standard than subsection (a)(1) claims against 
those who present false claims.69 Somewhat ironically, the court cited 
favorably to the First Circuit’s reasoning in Duxbury regarding a relaxed 
standard for claims of third-party inducement,70 despite the fact that 
Duxbury explicitly disavowed treating (a)(1) and (a)(2) claims differently 
under its 9(b) analysis.71 
3. The Fourth and Eighth Circuits’ Inflexibility.—The Fourth and 
Eighth Circuits have shown the least flexibility in their interpretations of 
Rule 9(b). The Eighth Circuit applies the same restrictive 9(b) standard to 
both subsection (a)(1) and subsection (a)(2) claims, effectively requiring a 
qui tam relator to plead details of specific fraudulent claims that were 
made.72 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has distanced itself from the more 
permissive standards.73 It requires details of specific claims where alleged 
behavior “could have led, but need not necessarily have led” to actually 
submitted false claims.74 
D. Restrictive with Hints of a Permissive Future: Tenth Circuit 
Prior to Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly75 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,76 the 
Tenth Circuit embraced the more restrictive 9(b) standard of requiring 
relators in FCA qui tam cases to provide information “identify[ing] 
particular false claims” submitted for government payment.77 Twombly and 
Iqbal created a storm of controversy over proper pleading requirements and 
have forced courts to reconsider pleading standards in a variety of 
 
68 Id. at 1329.  
69 Id. at 1329–30 (“[We] do not necessarily foreclose the possibility that, for claims under 
subsection (a)(2), general allegations of improper government payments to third parties, supported by 
factual or statistical evidence to strengthen the inference of fraud . . . could satisfy the particularity 
requirements of Rule 9(b).”).  
70 Id. at 1329 (citing United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 
(1st Cir. 2009)).  
71 Duxbury, 579 F.3d at 29 n.6.  
72 United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., 639 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing United States 
ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
73 See United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 456–58 (4th Cir. 
2013). 
74 Id. at 457.  
75 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
76 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
77 United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702, 727 
(10th Cir. 2006). 
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contexts.78 In 2010, after Twombly and Iqbal were decided, the Tenth 
Circuit hinted in United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc. 
at a more permissive standard for FCA qui tam relators, citing to First, 
Fifth, and Seventh Circuit cases for support.79 There, the Tenth Circuit 
emphasized that “[t]hough Twombly and Iqbal clarified 9(b)’s 
requirements,” the purpose of Rule 9(b) remained the same—to provide 
defendants with “fair notice of plaintiff’s claims” and the “factual ground 
upon which [the claims] are based.”80 It did not explicitly disavow its prior 
precedents and in fact cited much of the same restrictive language used in 
its prior cases, requiring FCA qui tam relators to plead the “who, what, 
when, where and how” of alleged fraudulent conduct.81 
1. Lemmon’s Mixed Approach to 9(b).—In Lemmon, the relators 
were a former employee of the defendant’s hazardous waste disposal 
company and two former employees of the defendant’s subcontractors.82 
The relators claimed that the defendant had improperly disposed of waste 
the government had contracted it to dispose of, and had falsely certified 
fulfillment of its duties to receive payment from the government.83 The 
relators alleged the names and positions of the employees and supervisors 
involved in the fraud, the specific obligations that were breached, and the 
dates and amounts of payment requests that were submitted. They also 
alleged intimate, extensive details regarding how and where the violations 
occurred at specific waste disposal sites, including unreported waste spills, 
improper mixing of waste, and other safety violations that breached the 
defendant’s contractual obligations to the government.84 
Perhaps because the allegations were already quite detailed, including 
some information regarding actual payment requests, the court did not 
appear to rely upon the more permissive 9(b) standard it had hinted at with 
its citations to more permissive circuits. The court instead fell back upon 
the more restrictive 9(b) analysis it had previously espoused.85 Applying its 
“who, what, when, where and how” standard, the court did not require the 
relators to point out which alleged violations resulted in which specific 
 
78 See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010); Martin H. Redish, Pleading, Discovery, and the Federal 
Rules: Exploring the Foundations of Modern Procedure, 64 FLA. L. REV. 845, 854–70 (2012).  
79 614 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech 
Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 
F.3d 849, 854–55 (7th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th 
Cir. 2009)) (“[C]laims under the FCA need only show the specifics of a fraudulent scheme and provide 
an adequate basis for a reasonable inference that false claims were submitted as part of that scheme.”). 
80 Lemmon, 614 F.3d at 1172.  
81 Id. at 1171–72 (quoting Sikkenga, 472 F.3d at 727).  
82 Id. at 1165–66. 
83 Id. at 1166. 
84 Id. at 1166, 1172. 
85 Id. at 1171–72. 
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false certification claims, and found that the allegations were sufficient to 
satisfy 9(b).86 It remains unclear how permissive the Tenth Circuit will be 
and what information about actual false claims it will require to survive 
12(b)(6) challenges to FCA claims in the future. 
E. Rule 9(b) Requirements: Continued Evolution in the FCA Context 
The losing parties in both Duxbury and Hopper petitioned the 
Supreme Court to reconsider their cases, providing the Court an 
opportunity to resolve the issue of whether a relator must allege details 
from specific false claims to meet Rule 9(b)’s requirements.87 At the 
invitation of the Court, the Solicitor General weighed in on behalf of the 
United States on the Duxbury petition.88 
1. The Government’s Interest in a More Permissive 9(b)  
Standard.—Though the Solicitor General advised the Court not to 
review Duxbury on other grounds, the Solicitor General encouraged the 
Court to address the issue of the level of specificity required for 9(b) in the 
FCA context. Noting the “substantial uncertainty” in the courts of appeals 
on this issue, the Solicitor General urged the Court to resolve it in favor of 
the circuits adhering to the more permissive 9(b) standard.89 The Solicitor 
General highlighted the importance of whistleblowers in the “detection and 
remediation of fraud against the United States,” and detailed its concern 
that legitimate whistleblowers would not be able to pursue FCA qui tam 
claims if courts required them to be “familiar with the minutiae of their 
employers’ billing practices.”90 The Solicitor General argued that a 
restrictive 9(b) standard requiring details of specific false claims would not 
“meaningfully assist” the government’s enforcement efforts, and would 
only serve to discourage potential relators from coming forward with 
valuable information.91 Despite these considerations, the Court ultimately 
declined to address the issue, denying certiorari in both appeals from 
Duxbury and Hopper.92 
 
86 Id. at 1172–73. 
87 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P. v. United States ex rel. Duxbury 
(2010) (No. 09-654), 2009 WL 4610708; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States ex rel. Hopper v. 
Solvay Pharm., Inc. (2010) (No. 09-091065), 2010 WL 2771705. 
88 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, Duxbury, 130 S. Ct.  3454 (No. 09-654), 2010 
WL 2007742, at *1.  
89 Id. at 16–17.  
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 17 (“The government rarely if ever needs a relator’s assistance to identify claims for 
payment . . . . [R]elators . . . make valuable contributions to the government’s enforcement efforts . . . 
by bringing to light information, outside the four corners of the claims for payment, that shows those 
claims to be false.”).  
92 Hopper v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
3465 (2010); United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3454 (2010). 
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2. Potential for Natural Realignment Favoring a More Permissive 
9(b) Standard.—Even without Supreme Court resolution, the 
circuits may independently be in the process of reconsidering and adjusting 
their interpretations of Rule 9(b) requirements in the FCA qui tam litigation 
context. Though the case law is still in flux, recent opinions have pointed to 
the possibility of a natural realignment in favor of a more permissive 
standard, or at the very least, exceptions that may allow for a relaxing of 
the more restrictive standard.93 
Some of the adjustments have already produced an uneasy mixing of 
standards, like the Tenth Circuit’s embrace of the permissive standard in 
Lemmon and citations to more permissive circuits, coupled with its 
retention of restrictive language and elements preserved from its prior 
precedents.94 Others have resulted in categories of cases carved out from 
otherwise restrictive standards, such as the exception for claims of third-
party inducement formally adopted by the First Circuit in Duxbury.95 
Similarly, despite the restrictive standard they have thus far applied, both 
the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have left the door open to possible future 
exceptions.96 
3. Unresolved: How Circuits May Shape Permissive Exceptions  
to 9(b).—Several fault lines remain for circuits considering more 
permissive exceptions to their restrictive Rule 9(b) standards, involving 
whether and in what circumstances to allow these exceptions, as well as the 
degree of permissiveness for any exceptions. The Eleventh Circuit 
appeared to appreciate the First Circuit’s carve-out of third-party 
inducement claims in Duxbury. At the same time, it favored grouping cases 
based on the statutory subsection they fall under, noting the possibility of 
different standards for subsection (a)(1) and subsection (a)(2) claims, an 
approach the First Circuit had rejected.97 Taking a different categorical 
approach, the Sixth Circuit in Chesbrough signaled the possibility of 
applying a more permissive standard for qui tam claimants with “personal 
knowledge” of fraudulent claim submissions, though it remains unclear 
what the parameters of that exception may be.98 
 
93 See, e.g., Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 470–72 (6th Cir. 2011); Hopper, 588 F.3d at 
1329–30; see also supra Part I.C. 
94 United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1171–72 (10th Cir. 
2010) (quoting United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702, 
727 (10th Cir. 2006)) (citing Duxbury, 579 F.3d at 29 (1st Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Lusby v. 
Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854–55 (7th Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 
565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)); see also supra Part I.D.  
95 Duxbury, 579 F.3d at 29–30; see also supra Part I.B. 
96 Chesbrough, 655 F.3d at 470–72; Hopper, 588 F.3d at 1329–30; see also supra Part I.C. 
97 Hopper, 588 F.3d at 1329 (citing Duxbury, 579 F.3d at 29); Duxbury, 579 F.3d at 29 n.6. 
98 Chesbrough, 655 F.3d at 471. 
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While the circuits may not naturally conform to a single standard 
without Supreme Court guidance, it appears that their differences are 
narrowing and will be further clarified as the courts of appeals continue to 
ruminate upon and adjust their approaches to this issue. Many if not most 
circuits have acknowledged at least the possibility of allowing certain 
claims to survive 9(b) without pointing to specific false documents. These 
courts have recognized the importance of protecting legitimate 
whistleblowers with valuable information who do not have access to a 
defendant’s actual bills or invoices. 
A key hesitation for courts considering a relaxation of 9(b) is the 
desire to avoid opening the floodgates to frivolous suits.99 Such concerns 
can and should be allayed with proper 9(b) calibration via the first-to-file 
rule, as discussed in Part II. By linking 9(b) to the first-to-file rule, courts 
can ensure that any advantage potential whistleblowers gain from a 
permissive 9(b) standard will be tempered by a proportionate increase in 
the number of claims defendants may use to block later claims. 
II. WHETHER A SECOND WHISTLEBLOWER IS BARRED FROM THE SAME 
QUI TAM CLAIM IF A PRIOR CLAIMANT FAILED TO SATISFY 9(b) 
The 1986 amendments to the FCA introduced the current version of 
the statutory provision that governs first-to-file claim preclusion, which 
bars subsequent claims based on the same facts as a pending action.100 
Through the 1986 amendments, Congress attempted to properly balance 
two main purposes: (1) to provide “adequate incentives”101 for true 
whistleblowers with useful information to come forward, and (2) to 
discourage “opportunistic plaintiffs”102 from filing “copycat actions”103 that 
do not provide useful information to the government.104  
The courts of appeals are struggling with the level of specificity an 
initial complaint must include in order to preclude subsequent claims. The 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits have generally found the first-to-file bar to apply 
 
99 See United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 456 (4th Cir. 
2013). 
100 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2012) (“When a person brings an action under this subsection, no 
person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying 
the pending action.”); United States ex rel. LaCorte v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 
F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 1998). 
101 United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
102 Id. 
103 United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
104 See Campbell v. Redding Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining the “dual 
purposes of the 1986 amendments: to promote incentives for whistle-blowing insiders and prevent 
opportunistic successive plaintiffs” (quoting United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 
F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001))). 
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only when a complaint has satisfied Rule 9(b)’s requirements.105 In 2011, 
the D.C. Circuit explicitly disavowed this rule, finding that a complaint 
need not meet 9(b)’s requirements for the first-to-file bar to apply.106 The 
resulting circuit split remains in the early stages of development, with 
implications for the 9(b) standard as discussed in Part I of this Note.107 
A. First Complaint Must Satisfy 9(b) to Preclude Subsequent Complaints: 
Sixth and Ninth Circuits 
The Sixth Circuit stated in Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp. that the 
purpose of the first-to-file bar is to prevent “repetitive claims” once a first-
filed claimant has given the government adequate notice of “essential 
facts” of the alleged fraud at issue.108 The court found that the complaint 
failed to comply with Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements. The 
complaint was therefore “legally infirm” and unable to bar similar 
subsequent actions via the first-to-file rule.109 The court noted that a 
complaint that fails to satisfy 9(b) by definition “fails to provide adequate 
notice to a defendant,” and thus also the government, of the “essential 
facts” of a fraudulent scheme.110 A rule allowing “fatally-broad” complaints 
to preempt similar, later complaints would prevent the government from 
obtaining more specific, useful information, and contravene the purpose of 
the FCA: to encourage whistleblowers to come forward and alert the 
government of fraud.111 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit decided that a first complaint had to 
satisfy 9(b) before it could bar subsequent complaints under the first-to-file 
rule.112 The court was particularly concerned about situations where 
allegations of FCA violations had already been publicly disclosed, such as 
in media or government reports on the issue.113 In these public disclosure 
cases, a qui tam relator must be an “original source” of the allegations to 
pursue his or her claim, defined by the statute as: 
[A]n individual who either (i) prior to a public disclosure under subsection 
(e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the information on 
which allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2) who has 
 
105 Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 972–73 (6th Cir. 2005); Campbell, 421 F.3d 
at 825.  
106 Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210.  
107 See United States ex rel. Wickliffe v. EMC Corp., 473 F. App’x 849, 851–52 (10th Cir. 2012).  
108 431 F.3d at 971 (quoting Lujan, 243 F.3d at 1187). 
109 Id. at 972–73.  
110 Id. at 973.  
111 Id. 
112 Campbell v. Redding Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2005). 
113 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2012) (requiring courts to dismiss a relators claims if “substantially the 
same allegations” were “publicly disclosed” unless the relator is an “original source” of relevant 
information); Campbell, 421 F.3d at 824.  
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knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed 
allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the information 
to the Government before filing an action under this section.114 
The court feared that without its requirement that a first-filed claim satisfy 
Rule 9(b), once allegations had been publicly disclosed, an “opportunistic 
plaintiff[]” with no useful “inside information” could simply file a “sham 
complaint” based on public information, and “displace actual insiders” 
from filing legitimate subsequent claims.115 
B. First Complaint Need Not Survive 9(b) to Have a Preclusive Effect: 
D.C. and Tenth Circuits 
In 2011, the D.C. Circuit unequivocally rejected the rule laid out by 
the Sixth Circuit in Walburn, and held in United States ex rel. Batiste v. 
SLM Corp. that a complaint need not meet Rule 9(b)’s requirements to bar 
subsequent complaints under the FCA.116 Under the D.C. Circuit’s 
formulation, to bar later-filed complaints, a first-filed complaint need only 
provide “sufficient notice” of the alleged fraud for the government to be 
able to investigate the matter.117 
1. The D.C. Circuit’s Reasons for Decoupling 9(b) from the First-to-
File Rule.—In articulating its rule, the D.C. Circuit relied on three 
main reasons. First, it looked to the plain language of the statutory 
provision governing first-to-file claim preclusion.118 The court noted that 
“nothing” in the statute itself requires a first claim to meet 9(b)’s 
heightened pleading requirements to preclude subsequent related claims.119 
Second, the court discussed the dual purposes of the first-to-file bar: to 
reward those who give the government enough information to investigate 
fraudulent schemes, and to prevent “copycat actions” that do not provide 
additional useful information to the government.120 
The court noted that a complaint that did not meet 9(b)’s requirements 
could still provide the government with “sufficient information” to launch 
an investigation into the alleged fraud at issue, obviating the need for 
additional claims to point out the same fraud.121 Compared to the complaint 
in Batiste, the first-filed complaint named the same defendant company, 
 
114 § 3730(e)(4)(B) (emphasis added). 
115 Campbell, 421 F.3d at 824. 
116 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (disavowing the rule articulated in Walburn, 431 F.3d at 
972).  
117 Id. 
118 See § 3730(b)(5) (“When a person brings an action under this subsection, no person other than 
the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending 
action.”). 
119 Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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alleged that the same type of fraudulent activity was taking place 
nationwide, and described similar corporate policies that promoted the 
fraudulent behavior.122 The court found that the prior complaint had 
included enough information to give the government “grounds to 
investigate” all the claims alleged in the second complaint, should the 
government so choose.123 Thus, the court dismissed the case because it 
found that the FCA’s first-to-file rule barred the second complaint. 
As the third and final part of its analysis, the court raised a practical 
concern with requiring a claim to meet 9(b) standards to preclude 
subsequent related suits. It noted that such a rule could require a district 
court with a second complaint before it to determine whether a first 
complaint pending in another district court satisfied 9(b).124 Such a “strange 
judicial dynamic” could lead to a problematic outcome, with the potential 
for the two courts to differ on the sufficiency of the same complaint under 
9(b).125 
2. Adherents and Potential Followers of the D.C. Circuit’s First-to-
File Rule.—The First Circuit has embraced the D.C. Circuit’s 
first-to-file rule in holding that “for the purposes of the first-to-file rule, the 
earlier-filed complaint need not meet the heightened pleading standard of 
Rule 9(b).”126 
The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged the split created by the D.C. 
Circuit in Batiste.127 Though it has avoided deciding which interpretation to 
adopt, it has echoed the D.C. Circuit’s concern regarding the “strange 
judicial dynamic” that could result should 9(b)’s requirements be 
incorporated into the first-to-file analysis.128 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit 
has also cited Batiste favorably on this issue.129 
3. Uncertainty in the Growing First-to-File Divide.—It is still too 
early to tell how the circuits will align in this divide without further 
guidance from the Supreme Court. For courts following the D.C. Circuit’s 
Batiste reasoning, it is also unclear what would be enough for a 9(b)-
deficient, first-filed complaint to give the government “sufficient notice” so 
as to bar later related complaints.130 Batiste itself did not articulate specific 
 
122 Id. at 1209. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 1210. 
125 Id. 
126 United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 718 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 2013); see also 
id. at 37 & n.10. 
127 United States ex rel. Wickliffe v. EMC Corp., 473 F. App’x 849, 851 (10th Cir. 2012). 
128 Id. at 851 (“We admit to being uneasy with the parties’ suggestion that Rule 9(b)’s particularity 
requirement should be applied to the first-to-file bar.”). 
129 Roberts v. Accenture, LLP, 707 F.3d 1011, 1018–19 (8th Cir. 2013). 
130 2011 Year-End False Claims Act Update, GIBSON DUNN 14 (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.
gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2011YearEndFalseClaimsActUpdate.aspx (“But Batiste notably 
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criteria for sufficiency and simply declared that the first complaint had 
provided enough information to put the government on notice of the 
fraudulent scheme alleged in the second case.131 Without more, the court 
determined it could bar Batiste’s claim, as the first claim was still pending 
at the time Batiste’s claim was filed.132 
4. Potential Workarounds for Later Relators Awaiting Resolution of 
a Pending First Claim.—Commentators have noted several 
possible loopholes for later relators who wish to file a claim while a similar 
first claim is still pending. First, the later relators could simply wait for the 
pending first claim to be dismissed before filing, thus avoiding the first-to-
file bar altogether because there would presumably be no pending claim at 
the time of the later claim’s filing.133 Second, if later relators have already 
filed, they may also seek to voluntarily dismiss their claims without 
prejudice and refile them after the first claim has been dismissed.134 Third, 
later relators who have already filed could also try to amend their 
complaints after the first case’s dismissal, and then argue that the first 
claim was not pending at the time of the amended filing.135 
Indeed, the relator in Batiste attempted to take the second route, and 
requested dismissal of his complaint without prejudice.136 However, the 
court determined that Batiste had waived this argument because he had not 
sought to amend his complaint in the district court.137 Although waiting, 
refiling, and amending might seem to be straightforward workarounds for 
later relators, they may not be able to discern whether their claims will be 
deemed sufficiently related to the first claims to be precluded under the 
first-to-file bar. By delaying, they may risk losing the opportunity to be a 
first-filed claim in their own right.138 
 
leaves unanswered the question of what standard governs whether an earlier-filed complaint constitutes 
‘sufficient notice for the government.’”).  
131 United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1209–10 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
132 Id. 
133 Circuits Split on First-to-File Rule for Whistleblower Suits, D.C. CIRCUIT REVIEW (Nov. 7, 
2011), http://dccircuitreview.com/2011/11/07/circuits-split-on-first-to-file-rule-for-whistleblower-suits/. 
134 Id. 
135 Id.; Ben Vernia, DC Circuit: First-to-File Qui Tam, Even If Inadequate Under Rule 9(b), 
Barred Later Suit, FALSE CLAIMS COUNSEL (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.falseclaimscounsel.com/
wordpress/?p=1576. 
136 Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1211. 
137 Id. 
138 For example, if Relator B is uncertain whether her claim is too similar to a pending claim by 
Relator A, Relator B may choose to wait for Relator A’s case to be resolved before filing her claim. 
While Relator B waits, Relator C may decide to try his luck and file the same claim Relator B was 
waiting to file. If Relator C’s claim is accepted by the court as not too similar to Relator A’s case, 
Relator B will have lost her chance to file her claim by waiting for Relator A’s case to resolve. See 
Vernia, supra note 135.  
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III. HOW THE 9(b) STANDARD SHOULD INFORM WHETHER A SECOND 
WHISTLEBLOWER IS PRECLUDED: AN ANALYSIS OF FOUR COMBINATIONS 
As the courts of appeals continue to redefine the contours of this area 
of law, it is critical to consider how interpretations of Rule 9(b) in the FCA 
context interact with different thresholds for triggering the first-to-file rule. 
In doing so, courts must weigh the overlap and differences between the 
purposes of Rule 9(b) and the first-to-file rule. 
Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard requires claims of fraud to 
be pled with particularity.139 It is designed to protect defendants from 
meritless, harassing accusations of fraud, given the potential for 
unwarranted harm to a defendant’s reputation from such claims and costly 
settlements that undeserving claimants could exact.140 It is also meant to 
provide defendants with enough detailed information about the alleged 
fraud to be able to properly respond.141 
Similarly, one of the two main purposes of the first-to-file rule is to 
prevent “copycat actions”142 to protect defendants from “opportunistic 
successive plaintiffs” who do not provide the government with useful new 
information.143 The second main purpose of the first-to-file rule is to 
incentivize plaintiffs with useful information to come forward, and to do so 
quickly, so that the government can stop the fraud as soon as possible.144 
In light of these purposes, an optimal balance of the 9(b) and first-to-
file requirements should achieve two main goals. First, it should encourage 
and allow plaintiffs to bring legitimate claims that provide the government 
with useful information about fraudulent schemes.145 Second, it should 
protect defendants from unnecessarily costly, frivolous, and redundant 
suits.146 
What follows is an analysis of different combinations of the circuit 
court standards for the 9(b) and first-to-file issues, and how each impacts 
the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants in the FCA context. As this 
Part shows, a more permissive 9(b) standard coupled with a first-to-file rule 
that is linked to 9(b) best balances the interests of all parties and fulfills the 
purposes of both 9(b) and the FCA. 
 
139 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a 
person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). 
140 United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 456 (4th Cir. 2013); 
United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2002). 
141 United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006). 
142 Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210. 
143 United States ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). 
144 See Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210; Lujan, 243 F.3d at 1187. 
145 See Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1208.   
146 See id. 
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A more permissive 9(b) standard will protect valuable classes of 
whistleblowers who have intimate knowledge of fraud, but who do not 
have access to a defendant’s actually submitted bills or invoices. By linking 
a lenient 9(b) standard to the first-to-file rule, courts will most efficiently 
calibrate the relevant interests of all parties, tempering any 9(b) expansion 
with a corresponding increase in the pool of claims that defendants can use 
to deter later-filed claims. 
For purposes of this analysis, “more permissive 9(b) standard” refers 
to allowing FCA qui tam complaints that do not allege details of specific 
submitted fraudulent claims, such as invoice billing amounts and dates.147 A 
“more restrictive 9(b) standard,” on the other hand, refers to requiring FCA 
complaints to allege details of specific submitted fraudulent claims. Table 1 
describes the different 9(b) standards and the circuits that have embraced 
each standard. 
TABLE 1: 




FCA qui tam complaints do 
not have to allege details of specific 
submitted fraudulent claims, such 








Some FCA qui tam 
complaints do not have to allege 
details of specific submitted 
fraudulent claims, but more 






FCA qui tam complaints must 







147 As discussed above, some circuits that identify with this more permissive standard also have 
restrictive elements to their analysis, but for the most part this section will focus on their more 
permissive elements. See United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 
1172 (10th Cir. 2010); United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st 
Cir. 2009); see also supra Part I.D–E.  
148 See United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009). 
149 See United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854–55 (7th Cir. 2009). 
150 See Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). 
151 See Duxbury, 579 F.3d at 29–30. 
152 See Lemmon, 614 F.3d at 1172. 
153 See United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 457–58 (4th Cir. 
2013). 
154 See Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 471 (6th Cir. 2011).  
155 See United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., 639 F.3d 791, 799–800 (8th Cir. 2011).  
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In the same vein, Table 2 describes the different first-to-file standards 
as they relate to 9(b), and the circuits that have embraced each standard. 
“Bars fewer claims via first-to-file rule” refers to requiring a first complaint 
to satisfy 9(b) before it can bar related later-filed complaints. Conversely, 
“bars more claims via first-to-file” refers to allowing certain first 
complaints to bar related later-filed complaints even if the first complaint 






claims via first-to-file 
rule” 
First complaint must satisfy 







First complaint need not 
satisfy 9(b) to bar related later-filed 







Favorable citation to the D.C. 
Circuit’s Batiste standard, but no 





A. One Checks the Other: More 9(b) Survivors, and Each Can Be Used to 
Block Future Claims 
Combining the more permissive 9(b) standard and the interpretation of 
the first-to-file rule that bars fewer claims would not require details of 
specific fraudulent claims for a complaint to satisfy 9(b), and would require 
a first complaint to satisfy 9(b) before it can bar related later-filed 
complaints.163 This combination successfully promotes the purposes of both 
 
156 See Hopper v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009). 
157 See Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 966, 972 (6th Cir. 2005). 
158 See Campbell v. Redding Med. Ctr., 421 F.3d 817, 825 (9th Cir. 2005). 
159 See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  
160 United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 718 F.3d 28, 36–37 & n.10 (1st Cir. 
2013). 
161 See United States ex rel. Wickliffe v. EMC Corp., 473 F. App’x 849, 851 (10th Cir. 2012).  
162 See Roberts v. Accenture, LLP, 707 F.3d 1011, 1017–19 (8th Cir. 2013). 
163 The Ninth Circuit currently fits this category given its permissive 9(b) standard as articulated in 
Ebeid and its 9(b) requirement for first-to-file preclusion as discussed in Campbell. Ebeid ex rel. United 
States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2010); Campbell 421 F.3d at 825. 
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9(b) and the first-to-file rule. A permissive 9(b) standard will allow 
plaintiffs to bring legitimate claims, while the ability to use each surviving 
claim as a bar on future claims serves as a natural check to protect 
defendants from redundant copycat suits. 
At first glance, this standard might make defendants nervous, because 
each independently would appear to favor plaintiffs and grant more of them 
access to the courts. For example, a defendant might be concerned about 
the increased number of claims that are allowed to survive 9(b) under a 
more permissive standard.164 Separately, defendants may also fear that they 
will not be able to use failed (but still costly) claims that did not survive 
9(b) to bar future redundant suits.165 
However, the more complaints that satisfy 9(b), the more ammunition 
defendants have to block related claims using the first-to-file bar. When the 
two rules are combined, the more permissive 9(b) rule actually tempers the 
benefit that plaintiffs might otherwise get from a rule requiring 9(b) 
compliance for precluding later-filed claims. Though this standard would 
allow more plaintiffs to survive a 12(b)(6) challenge initially, each of those 
complaints could then be used to preclude later related claims, per the first-
to-file rule. 
This may be cold comfort to defendants who would prefer both spigots 
for relator access to be tightened, but this standard does justice to the 
purposes behind 9(b) and the first-to-file rule. This balanced approach does 
not prematurely block potential claimants who have valuable information 
to share with the government, even if they are not privy to a defendant’s 
specific fraudulent invoices or bills.166 At the same time, the clearly defined 
set of 9(b)-satisfactory claims that defendants can use to block future 
related claims will serve as a check on the increased pool of potential 
plaintiffs. This standard provides certainty and efficiency to both parties in 
resolving FCA claims, by eliminating the question of what counts as 
“sufficient notice” to bar future claims.167 
Defendants may rightly be concerned should courts that adopt this 
standard read “related” narrowly and allow only very similar or near-
identical claims to be barred. Such an interpretation would severely limit 
the natural check on claims that this standard would otherwise provide. 
This combination would then perhaps favor plaintiffs without adequately 
protecting defendants, as both Rule 9(b) and the first-to-file rule are 
designed to do. Thus, a court’s permissiveness in determining which claims 
are “related” for preclusion purposes should also be calibrated to ensure an 
optimal balance is maintained in the relative advantages each party enjoys. 
 
164 See supra Part I.A. 
165 See supra Part II.A.  
166 See supra Part I.A. 
167 See supra text accompanying note 130. 
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B. The Other Checks the One: Fewer Claims Squeak Past 9(b), and Only 
Survivors Can Block Future Claims 
Combining the more restrictive 9(b) standard and the interpretation of 
the first-to-file rule that bars fewer claims would require details of specific 
allegedly fraudulent claims for a complaint to satisfy 9(b), and would 
require a first complaint to satisfy 9(b) before it can bar related later-filed 
complaints.168 
In jurisdictions applying this combination, though plaintiffs may be 
concerned by the restrictiveness of 9(b), they can at least take comfort in 
the fact that fewer surviving complaints means fewer claims that can be 
used by defendants to bar subsequent related claims. With the standards 
linked in this way, any advantage one side may garner in a given standard 
could presumably be mitigated by its corresponding check in the other 
standard. 
However, the more restrictive 9(b) standard would also result in 
elimination at the outset of entire classes of plaintiffs with useful 
knowledge of fraud against the government but who do not have access to 
billing or accounting information.169 To prevent all such claimants from 
bringing whistleblower claims seems to cut too far against one of the main 
goals of the FCA: to encourage relators with valuable information to come 
forward. 
The Sixth Circuit’s Walburn case illustrates this point. In Walburn, the 
Sixth Circuit considered a first-filed complaint that was pending in a 
Maryland district court at the time the action before the court was filed.170 
The Sixth Circuit determined that the first complaint failed to satisfy 9(b) 
under the more restrictive 9(b) standard because it did not allege details of 
actually submitted fraudulent documents and records.171 While the failed 
claim could not be used to bar similar future claims, that is no comfort to 
 
168 The Sixth Circuit fits into this category, with its restrictive 9(b) standard as articulated in 
Chesbrough and Bledsoe, and its 9(b) requirement for first-to-file preclusion as discussed in Walburn. 
Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 471 (6th Cir. 2011); United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. 
Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 504–05 (6th Cir. 2007); Walburn v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 431 F.3d 
966, 972 (6th Cir. 2005). 
169 See supra text accompanying note 91. 
170 431 F.3d at 969. 
171 Id. at 972. Notably, the Sixth Circuit did not have the same qualms as the D.C. Circuit about the 
“strange judicial dynamic” of one court assessing the sufficiency of a first complaint pending in another 
court. See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Instead, it 
decided that while it could “take judicial notice” of the other court’s proceedings, the “ultimate fate” of 
the first complaint in the other court was immaterial to the Sixth Circuit’s determination of whether the 
first complaint could bar the later-filed case before the court. Walburn 431 F.3d at 973 n.5 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (noting that the court was only concerned with “whether the earlier action was 
‘pending’ at the time the later action was filed”). Perhaps this was less of a concern because the first 
action was in a district court, whereas the second action was being considered in an appellate court. 
However, the court’s reasoning appears to suggest that its analysis would apply even at the district court 
level. 
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plaintiffs without specific invoice or billing information who cannot 
survive 9(b) in the first place. Thus, where no such claims will be allowed 
at all, the first-to-file rule has nothing to “check.” 
C. Something for Each Side: More Claims Allowed, and Even Deficient 
Claims Can Be Used to Block Future Claims 
Combining the more permissive 9(b) standard and the interpretation of 
the first-to-file rule that bars more claims would not require details of 
specific fraudulent claims for a complaint to satisfy 9(b), and would not 
require a first complaint to satisfy 9(b) before it can bar related later-filed 
complaints.172 
In this combination, the two rules may counteract each other. The 
more permissive 9(b) standard would expand the pool of potential 
claimants to include those who have detailed knowledge of fraud but lack 
direct access to a defendant’s billing and accounting departments. On the 
other hand, the first-to-file rule would be unrestricted by 9(b). This would 
allow defendants to more freely exercise the first-to-file bar to preclude 
related claims, even where a first complaint cannot survive 9(b) scrutiny. 
This standard may seem to give a comparable advantage to each side 
by allowing more claims to survive 9(b) and allowing even more of them to 
be used to bar future related claims. However, a central flaw in this 
approach is the decoupling of the 9(b) standard from the first-to-file rule. 
Although initially this standard may appear to provide balance between 
plaintiffs and defendants, in practice, without a direct relationship between 
the 9(b) and first-to-file standards, the system may tip in one side’s favor. It 
is hard to predict how many more claims will be allowed to survive 9(b) 
under the more permissive standard, and how many more claims can be 
used to preclude under the “bars more claims” first-to-file rule. These 
uncertainties may vary court to court, and perhaps even judge to judge. 
Without one standard tethered to the other, there is no effective, self-
enforcing check on either standard, which, taken to the extreme, could 
overwhelm any potentially balancing effects of the other standard. 
 
172 With its newly permissive 9(b) interpretation in Lemmon, the Tenth Circuit may soon fit this 
category, assuming that it officially confirms its approval of the D.C. Circuit’s first-to-file rule, as it 
hinted at in Wickliffe. United States ex rel. Wickliffe v. EMC Corp., 473 F. App’x 849, 851 (10th Cir. 
2012) (citing favorably to Batiste, 659 F.3d at 1210); United States ex rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of 
Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2010). Of course, it may still be too early to tell just how 
permissive the Tenth Circuit’s 9(b) jurisprudence will become, given that it continues to cite to and 
apply restrictive elements of its prior, more restrictive 9(b) standard. Lemmon, 614 F.3d at 1171–72 
(quoting United States ex rel. Sikkenga v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702, 727 
(10th Cir. 2006)). Similarly, with the First Circuit’s embrace of the D.C. Circuit’s first-to-file rule, it 
falls into this category as well, at least for claims that qualify for Duxbury’s permissive 9(b) exception 
for third-party inducement. United States ex rel. Heineman-Guta v. Guidant Corp., 718 F.3d 28, 37 & 
n.10 (1st Cir. 2013); United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st 
Cir. 2009).  
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D. Tightening Both Spigots: Fewer Claims Survive 9(b), Yet Even 
Deficient Claims Can Be Used to Block Future Claims 
Combining the more restrictive 9(b) standard and the interpretation of 
the first-to-file rule that bars more claims would require details of specific 
fraudulent claims for a complaint to satisfy 9(b), and would not require a 
first complaint to satisfy 9(b) before it could bar related later-filed 
complaints under the first-to-file rule.173 
Defendants would be at a great advantage in jurisdictions using these 
two standards. They would benefit from the restrictive 9(b) standard at the 
outset, shutting the door to all potential plaintiffs without access to actual 
documentation of allegedly fraudulent claims. Defendants would also be 
able to draw from the full pool of pending complaints to bar subsequent 
related complaints regardless of the first-filed complaint’s ability to satisfy 
9(b). They would benefit from both standards, essentially tightening both 
spigots to whistleblower plaintiffs’ access to the courts. While the 
combination of a stringent 9(b) standard and a liberal first-to-file bar would 
certainly fulfill the rules’ goal of protecting fraud defendants from 
frivolous, redundant suits, it goes too far in contravening the overarching 
purpose of the FCA—to encourage legitimate plaintiffs to come forward 
with useful information. 
This standard cuts out a large swath of plaintiffs at the outset: those 
who have valuable information on fraud committed against the 
government, but who do not have access to individual bills or invoices. 
Untethered to the 9(b) standard, the first-to-file rule is at risk of uneven and 
unprincipled application, based on what individual judges deem to be 
enough information to put the government and defendants “on notice” of a 
particular set of claims.174 This combination is both overly restrictive and 
lacking in certainty, creating a procedural imbalance that heavily favors 
defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The courts of appeals continue to grapple with striking the right 
balance between encouraging legitimate whistleblowers to come forward 
and deterring redundant, frivolous suits. With the ever-increasing number 
of FCA qui tam claims,175 it is more important than ever for courts to 
 
173 With its restrictive 9(b) standard as articulated in Vigil and Joshi, and approval of the D.C. 
Circuit’s first-to-file rule in Roberts, the Eighth Circuit falls within this category. Roberts v. Accenture, 
LLP, 707 F.3d 1011, 1017–19 (8th Cir. 2013); United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., 639 F.3d 791, 
799–800 (8th Cir. 2011); United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th 
Cir. 2006). Similarly, with the First Circuit’s embrace of the D.C. Circuit’s first-to-file rule, FCA cases 
that do not qualify for the Duxbury third-party inducement 9(b) exception could also fall into this 
category. Heineman-Guta, 718 F.3d at 36, 37 & n.10; Duxbury, 579 F.3d at 29. 
174 See United States ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
175 See Fraud Statistics, supra note 9. 
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consider how their interpretations of Rule 9(b) and the first-to-file rule 
interact, and whether the combined effects of their interpretations serve to 
further the underlying purposes of the FCA and Rule 9(b). 
At the outset, courts should embrace a more permissive 9(b) standard 
to ensure that valuable whistleblower claims are not prematurely dismissed 
because of a claimant’s lack of access to particular bills or invoices. This 
will prevent defendants from escaping liability by simply separating out 
their billing departments from their production and service departments. 
Coupled with an expanded interpretation of permissible claims under 
9(b), courts should require claims to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 
(i.e., satisfy 9(b)) before they can be used to preclude related later-filed 
complaints. A direct relationship between the two standards is vital to 
maintaining the appropriate balance between the relative advantages of 
whistleblower plaintiffs and defendants, and fulfilling the purposes of both 
9(b) and the FCA. By linking the first-to-file bar to Rule 9(b), courts can 
ensure a self-checking procedural system. Any increase in permissible 
claims will be tempered by the same amount of increase in claims that can 
be used to preclude related later-filed claims. 
As courts continue to shape the contours of each of the two standards, 
considering their connection will be vital to both encouraging legitimate 
whistleblowers to bring claims and protecting defendants from redundant 
lawsuits. 
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